Freedom to Contract in Texas - Enforceability of an As Is Clause in a Commercial Leased: Gym-N-I Playgrounds, Inc. v. Snider by Smeltzer, Natalie
SMU Law Review
Volume 61 | Issue 2 Article 10
2008
Freedom to Contract in Texas - Enforceability of an
As Is Clause in a Commercial Leased: Gym-N-I
Playgrounds, Inc. v. Snider
Natalie Smeltzer
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.smu.edu/smulr
This Case Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at SMU Scholar. It has been accepted for inclusion in SMU Law Review
by an authorized administrator of SMU Scholar. For more information, please visit http://digitalrepository.smu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Natalie Smeltzer, Freedom to Contract in Texas - Enforceability of an As Is Clause in a Commercial Leased: Gym-N-I Playgrounds, Inc. v.
Snider, 61 SMU L. Rev. 509 (2008)
https://scholar.smu.edu/smulr/vol61/iss2/10
FREEDOM TO CONTRACT IN TEXAS-
ENFORCEABILITY OF AN "As Is"




EXAS has long supported parties' freedom to contract.' Repeat-
edly, the Texas Supreme Court has upheld the right to contract as
parties desire, unless the contract violates the law or public pol-
icy.2 As a part of the bargaining process, parties may wish to allocate
certain risks. In Gym-N-I Playgrounds, Inc. v. Snider, the Texas Supreme
Court had to decide whether an "as is" disclaimer in a commercial lease
waived breach of warranty and other claims founded on the property's
condition by the tenant.3 The court correctly held that the "as is" dis-
claimer was effective during the holdover tenancy, precluding the tenant's
claim for breach of implied warranty of suitability and negating the causa-
tion element of the tenant's other claims.4 This case extended the Texas
Supreme Court's holding in Prudential Insurance Company of America v.
Jefferson Associates, Ltd. that an "as is" clause is enforceable in a sales
transaction to a commercial lease.5 The lower courts must follow this
authority and foster the freedom of parties to contract, absent violation
of public policy or law.
In 1983, Ron Snider constructed a 20,075 square foot building in New
Braunfels, Texas, for his playground equipment business, Gym-N-I Play-
grounds, Inc. ("Gym-N-I"). 6 The fire marshal recommended, but did not
require, that Gym-N-I install a sprinkler system in the building, but
Snider never implemented this recommendation. 7 Years later, Patrick
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1. E.g., Wood Motor Co. v. Nebel, 238 S.W.2d 181, 185 (Tex. 1951).
2. E.g., In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 148 S.W.3d 124, 129 (Tex. 2004); Lawrence v.
CDB Servs., Inc., 44 S.W.3d 544, 553 (Tex. 2001).
3. Gym-N-I Playgrounds, Inc. v. Snider, 220 S.W.3d 906, 908 (Tex. 2007).
4. Id. at 912.
5. 896 S.W.2d 156, 163-64 (Tex. 1995).
6. Gym-N-I Playgrounds, Inc., 220 S.W.3d at 906.
7. Id.
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Finn and Connie Caddell, two of Snider's employees, purchased the busi-
ness and leased the building from Snider. 8 Finn and Caddell, who were
aware that the fire marshal's recommendation had not been imple-
mented, did not inspect the property before leasing it because they had
extensive knowledge of the building.9 Both parties were represented by
counsel, and the lease was signed on September 30, 1993.10 Provisions in
the lease stated that Gym-N-I would "(1) accept the building 'as is,' ex-
pressly waiving all warranties; (2) obtain insurance on the building to
cover fire-related loss; and (3) perform maintenance and repairs."" Ad-
ditionally, the lease contained a holdover provision stating that "[a]ny
holding over without written consent of Landlord shall constitute a lease
from month-to-month, under the terms and provisions of this Lease to
the extent applicable to a tenancy from month-to-month. ' 12 The lease
also contained provisions obligating Gym-N-I to insure the premises
against fire damage and to maintain compliance with all building and fire
codes and other applicable laws and regulations. 13
Although the original lease term expired in September 1996, Gym-N-I
continued to pay, and Snider continued to accept, monthly rent without
executing a new instrument.' 4 On August 10, 2000, a fire destroyed the
building. Snider received $400,000, and Gym-N-I nearly $1,000,000, from
their respective insurance policies.15 Gym-N-I claimed that the fire was
caused by defective electrical wiring and the absence of a sprinkler
system.16
Gym-N-I brought a suit against Snider for negligence-related claims,
Deceptive Trade Practices-Consumer Protection Act violations, breach of
the implied warranty of suitability for commercial purposes, fraud, and
other claims. 17 Based on Snider's arguments that the claims were barred
by the "as is" clause and the warranty disclaimer, the trial court granted
summary judgment to Snider on all claims, except for a breach of contract
claim which settled.' 8
On appeal, Gym-N-I argued that the "as is" clause was not effective
during the holdover tenancy, and alternatively, that the clause was unen-
forceable.1 9 The court of appeals affirmed the judgment of the trial
court, and Gym-N-I petitioned the Texas Supreme Court for review.20
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 906-07.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 907 n.4.
13. Id. at 907 nn.2-3.
14. Id. at 907.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 907-08, 914.
18. Id.




The Texas Supreme Court affirmed the judgment, holding that at the
time of the fire the "as is" clause was effective, and the express warranty
disclaimer waived the implied warranty of suitability and defeated the
causation element of Gym-N-I's other claims.21 The court held that per
the plain and ordinary meaning of the words in the holdover clause, the
"as is" clause was effective during the holdover tenancy.22 Because pro-
visions of a lease that are expressly agreed upon control, and absent fraud
in the inducement, a party that signs a contract containing an "as is"
clause can waive property condition claims. 23 Thus, the court concluded
that an express warranty disclaimer could, as a matter of law, effectively
waive the implied warranty of suitability.24 Further, the court noted that
this conclusion supported strong public policy in Texas of freedom to
contract.
25
The court reasoned that the "as is" clause was in effect during the hold-
over, because both parties agreed that their relationship portrayed a
holdover as envisaged by the holdover provision, and because the plain
and ordinary meaning of the words of the provision-"under the terms
and provisions of this Lease"-meant exactly what they said.2 6 Addition-
ally, the court rejected Gym-N-I's argument that the original terms of the
lease did not apply to the holdover period as in Bockelmann v. Marynick,
since the issue in that case was the liability of co-tenants who did not
holdover, rather than whether the original terms applied during holdo-
ver.27 In Bockelmann v. Marynick, Ms. Bockelmann, co-tenant in a resi-
dential lease with her husband, separated from her husband and vacated
the leased premises before the lease term expired. 28 Mr. Bockelmann
remained on the premises after the lease had expired as a holdover ten-
ant, and subsequently, the landlords sued the tenants for past due rent,
among other things.2 9 The court held that Ms. Bockelmann was liable for
rent and other damages during her husband's holdover tenancy. 30 Not
only did the Gym-N-I court distinguish the issue in Bockelmann, it also
pointed out that in Bockelmann the court actually gave effect to the origi-
nal lease by subjecting the new tenancy to the original terms.3 1
Once the court established that the "as is" clause remained effective
during holdover, the court addressed the key issue of whether the clause
21. Id.
22. Id. at 908-09.
23. Id. at 912.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 908-09 (emphasis added).
27. Id.
28. Bockelmann v. Marynick, 788 S.W.2d 569, 570 (Tex. 1990).
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Gym-N-I Playgrounds, Inc., 220 S.W.3d at 909. The Gym-N-I court also noted that
at least one court of appeals had identified this distinction and rejected a holdover tenant's
argument that Bockelmann supports the position that guarantees in the original lease were
not effective during holdover. Id. (citing Clark v. Whitehead, 874 S.W.2d 282, 284 (Tex.
App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, writ denied)).
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waived some or all of Gym-N-I's claims.32 Analyzing its holdings in Da-
vidow v. Inwood North Professional Group-Phase P 3 and Prudential In-
surance Company of America v. Jefferson Associates, Ltd.34 in light of one
another, the court concluded that when a lease expressly disclaims the
implied warranty of suitability, it is waived as a matter of law. 35 In Da-
vidow, a landlord brought suit for unpaid rent and other costs against a
commercial tenant who offered the affirmative defense, among other de-
fenses, that the landlord breached an implied warranty of suitability. 36
Extending the implied warranty of habitability in residential leases to
commercial leases, the Davidow court held that there is an implied war-
ranty of suitability by the landlord in a commercial lease, meaning that
"at the inception of the lease there are no latent defects in the facilities
that are vital to the use of the premises for their intended commercial
purpose and that these essential facilities will remain in a suitable condi-
tion."'37 Although the Davidow court did not have the occasion to ad-
dress whether the implied warranty could be waived, they did note that if
"the parties to a lease expressly agree that the tenant will repair certain
defects, then the provisions of the lease will control."'38
In Jefferson Associates, a purchaser of a commercial building alleged
that the vendor violated the Deceptive Trade Practices Act and fraudu-
lently concealed the existence of asbestos fireproofing in the building. 39
The contract for the sale included an "as is" clause which provided that
"Purchaser is taking the Property 'AS IS' with any and all latent and pat-
ent defects and that there is no warranty by Seller that the Property is fit
for a particular purpose. '40 Holding the "as is" clause negated the causa-
tion element of all the purchaser's claims, the court reasoned that a buyer
agreeing to purchase something "as is" makes his own judgment of the
bargain through the allocation of risks.41 The Gym-N-I court pointed out
that in Prudential it did not consider the effect an "as is" would have on a
breach of implied warranty of suitability claim in a lease because the
transaction at issue was a commercial property sale, rather than a lease.42
By combining its proposition in Davidow, that terms in the lease con-
trol when parties expressly agree the tenant is responsible for the repair
of certain defects, with its holding in Jefferson Associates, that an "as-is"
32. Id.
33. 747 S.W.2d 373 (Tex. 1988).
34. 896 S.W.2d 156 (Tex. 1995).
35. Gym-N-I Playgrounds, Inc., 220 S.W.3d at 912.
36. Davidow, 747 S.W.2d at 375.
37. Id. at 377.
38. Id. at 377. The Gym-N-I court noted that while several courts of appeals have
addressed the scope of the waiver since Davidow, the Supreme Court had not since had a
chance to address it. Gym-N-I Playgrounds, Inc., 220 S.W.3d at 910.
39. Jefferson Assocs., 896 S.W.2d at 158.
40. Id. at 160.
41. Id. at 161. The court noted that there could be exceptions to the enforceability of
an "as is" clause in situations where there is fraud in the inducement of the contract or if
the seller impairs the buyer's inspection of the property. Id. at 162.
42. Gym-N-I Playgrounds, Inc., 220 S.W.3d at 912.
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clause can waive claims founded on a condition of the property, the Texas
Supreme Court in Gym-N-I concluded that the implied warranty of suita-
bility is waived when it is expressly disclaimed in a lease.43 Further, pub-
lic policy in Texas strongly supports freedom to contract. 44 The court
reasoned that this liberty allows the lessee and lessor to allocate risks
regarding the suitability of the premises and to negotiate prices accord-
ingly.45 Citing to Jefferson Associates, the court stated that by leasing
property "as is," Gym-N-I agreed to make its own judgment of the physi-
cal condition of the property and, therefore, negated the causation ele-
ment of the other claims.46
Finally, the court acknowledged that the holding was in contrast to the
implied warranty of habitability, which the court had previously held "can
be waived only to the extent that defects are adequately disclosed.
47
The court reconciled this conflict given that in most jurisdictions the war-
ranty of habitability does not cover commercial tenancies, as the disparity
of bargaining power in residential transactions is lacking in commercial
transactions. 48
In Gym-N-I the Texas Supreme Court correctly upheld a waiver of the
implied warranty of suitability when it was expressly disclaimed in a com-
mercial lease. Unlike the implied warranty of habitability, which has a
statutory foundation, the implied warranty of suitability is based solely on
common law.49 Consequently, the Texas Supreme Court, which estab-
lished this warranty of suitability, is the mandatory authority on the law
absent legislative action. By combining its previous opinions in Davidow
and Jefferson Associates, the court logically concluded that the warranty
can be waived in a commercial lease. The court took the opportunity
presented by the facts of this case to extend its holding in Jefferson Asso-
ciates from commercial sales to commercial leases and set forth the law
regarding the waiver of the warranty of suitability.50 More remarkably,
examining the opinion from a broader viewpoint, the court seized the
43. Id.
44. Id. at 912-13. The court cited to recent decisions in which they have reaffirmed
the long-standing policy in favor of the right to contract. See, e.g., BMG Direct Mktg., Inc.
v. Peake, 178 S.W.3d 763, 767 (Tex. 2005); In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 148 S.W.3d 124,
129 (Tex. 2004).
45. Gym-N-I Playgrounds, Inc., 220 S.W.3d at 912-13.
46. Id. at 914.
47. Id. at 913-14 (quoting Centex Homes v. Buecher, 95 S.W.3d 266, 274 (Tex. 2002)).
The Gym-N-I court also noted that after its decision in Centex, the Legislature formed a
rulemaking authority called the Texas Residential Construction Commission. Id. at 914
(citing to TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 408.001(2) (Vernon 2007)).
48. Gym-N-I Playgrounds, Inc., 220 S.W.3d at 913; 2 RICHARD R. POWELL, POWELL
ON REAL PROPERTY § 233[2][b] (Michael A. Wolf ed., 2007).
49. TEX. PROP. CODE § 408.001(2); Davidow v. Inwood IV Prof'l Group Phase I, 747
S.W.2d 373, 377 (Tex. 1988).
50. Interestingly, the court in Gym-N-I explained that it had not had the occasion to
determine whether the implied warranty of suitability could be waived when the court
established it in Davidow, or in Jefferson Associates which dealt with a commercial sale
rather than a lease. Gym-N-I Playgrounds, Inc., 220 S.W.3d at 910, 912.
2008]
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occasion to endorse Texas's long standing support of freedom to contract
by enforcing the "as is" clause.
Notably, the court could have found that the warranty of suitability was
ineffective without explicitly addressing the broader issue of enforceabil-
ity of "as is" clauses. In fact, the Respondent argued in his brief that the
warranty was not applicable.51 The warranty of suitability protects
against latent defects existing at the commencement of the lease.52 A la-
tent defect is defined as one which is "hidden, . . . concealed .... [cannot]
be discovered by ... observation or inspection made with ordinary care,
... or which [the] owner has no knowledge. ' 53 Therefore, the lack of
sprinkler system cannot be a latent defect because Gym-N-I knew there
was no sprinkler system at the time the lease was commenced. Gym-N-I
could have negotiated terms to address the issue, such as obligating
Snider to install a sprinkler system. Both parties were represented by
counsel and they chose to allocate risks in this manner as part of the
bargaining process. Furthermore, Gym-N-I could have inspected the
electrical wiring before commencing the lease, but chose not to inspect
the premises. The court, obviously aware of the latent defect argument
since it was made it in Respondent's brief, wisely chose instead to use this
case more expansively to support the freedom to contract policy.
The court's decision in Gym-N-I could have a significant impact on
Texas common law regarding the freedom to contract. There have al-
ready been several appellate courts which have had the opportunity to
address the Gym-N-I case, but to date there has not been a Texas case to
explicitly follow the holding.54 El Sabor De Mi Tierra, Inc. v. Atascocital
Boone J.V., involving a commercial lease, distinguished Gym-N-I on
grounds that the "as is" clause in El Sabor specifically applied to the
"Deemed Premises," and the alleged claims related to matters outside the
"Deemed Premises."'55 Therefore, the court held that the "as is" clause
did not waive the allegations because they occurred outside the "Deemed
Premises."'56 In Kupchynsky v. Nardiello, a case involving a dispute over
a residential property sales contact, the dissent argued that the majority
did not find that the buyers proved the fraud exception, expanding the
Prudential exceptions to "negligent or unintentional misrepresenta-
tion."'57 Additionally, the dissent noted that this decision would permit
51. Respondent's Brief on the Merits at 25, Gym-N-I Playgrounds, Inc. v. Snider, 220
S.W.3d 906 (Tex. 2007) (No. 05-0197).
52. See Davidow, 747 S.W.2d at 377.
53. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 456 (6th ed. 1990) (referring to "hidden defects").
54. See El Sabor De Mi Tierra, Inc. v. Atascocita/Boone J.V., No. 05-05-01134-CV,
2007 WL 2417921, at *11-12 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] Aug. 28, 2007, pet. filed);
Kupchynsky v. Nardiello, 230 S.W.3d 685 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2007, pet. filed).
55. El Sabor De Mi Tierra, Inc., 2007 WL 2417921, at *12.
56. Id.
57. Kupchynsky, 230 S.W.3d at 698. The majority held that whether the "as is" clause
in a standard, preprinted residential contract was enforceable depended on the totality of
the circumstances, and that in this case it was boilerplate language that was not an "impor-
tant basis of the bargain." Id. However, the dissent believed that the burden was on the
party trying to avoid the "as is" clause to plead and prove that the clause was unenforce-
[Vol. 61
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courts and juries to reform contracts for parties by guessing what the par-
ties "should have known," which would be in opposition to the Gym-N-I
holding reaffirming the freedom to contract.
58
In conclusion, Texas has yet to see to what extent the Gym-N-I holding
will affect the common law freedom to contract principle. The court
should be commended for making a step in the right direction as far as
supporting freedom to contract, especially in light of recent appellate
court decisions that have not upheld the enforceability of "as is"
clauses.59 As explained, the Gym-N-I case is not only important for com-
mercial lease agreements, but it also has broader significance for "as is"
and waiver of reliance clauses in commercial transactions of all types.
Seeing that the court has extended its ruling from commercial sales to
commercial leases, it is likely that the court will continue to uphold par-
ties' choice of risk allocation in various transactions. Furthermore, deci-
sions such as this will impact the drafting and negotiating of contracts in
Texas. Parties can negotiate and bargain with the assurance that their
choice of risk allocation will be upheld. The significance of this holding
permeates the common law of contracts. Practitioners will have to stay
tuned to see what step the Texas Supreme Court will take next to uphold
and promote this paramount policy of freedom to contract in Texas.
able per one of the Prudential exceptions. Id. at 690-91. Absent an exception, the clause
negated causation. Id. at 693.
58. Id. at 698.
59. See, e.g., Warehouse Assocs. Corporate Centre II, Inc v. Celotex Corp., 192 S.W.3d
225, 234 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2006, pet. denied).
2008]
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